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Abstract: Using Turkey’s 2013 Demographic and Health Survey, I find that among married women,
having a single child as opposed to no children is associated with an approximately five-percentage-
point increase in the likelihood of religious veiling. Furthermore, the likelihood of religious veiling
increases as the number of a woman’s children increases. Robustness checks show that these
associations are rather stable across the Muslim world. In addition, I use the sex of a woman’s first
child as a natural experiment and find that in Turkey, having a son versus a daughter increases the
likelihood of religious veiling by 2.2 percentage points. In contrast, having a child and the sex of the
first child have no significant effects on unobservable religious behaviors, traditional values, and
gender norms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis derived from signaling theory that
women use veiling strategically to foster family reputation.
Keywords: signaling theory; religion; Islam; religious veiling; natural experiments; causal methods
SIGNALING theory, developed simultaneously in biology (Zahavi 1975) and ineconomics (Spence 1974), tackles a key issue with communication: how an
interpreter of a message (the receiver) can establish that the agent emitting the
message (the signaler) is conveying the truth when the signaler might have an
incentive to misrepresent (Gambetta 2009). Simultaneously, the theory tackles the
problem of how the signaler can persuade the receiver that the signal is conveying
the truth.
In its most stylized form, the theory deals with interdependent situations in
which a signaler and a receiver interact. There is asymmetric information. There
are various “types” of signalers. The signaler knows which type they are, and
the receiver does not. The receiver, however, observes signals. Signals are actions
taken by the signaler. Depending on the incentive structure and the distribution
of signaler types in the population, the signal may convey truthful information
about the unobservable type of the signaler. The signal may be separating (different
types of signalers emit different signals), pooling (all types emit the same signal), or
partially separating (all types send the same signal but in varying frequencies or
intensities). The receiver interprets the signal and acts accordingly. The action of the
receiver in combination with the type of the signaler, in turn, affects the payoffs of
the signaler and the receiver. Whether the signal is (partially) separating or pooling
depends on the differential costs and benefits of the signal for different types of
signalers. A detailed treatment of signaling theory can be found in most game
theory textbooks (e.g., Gibbons 1992).
In addition to animal behavior, morphology, and microeconomics (in which
the theory originated), ideas from signaling theory are applied in a wide array
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of disciplines, from sociology to international relations (see Gambetta 2009 for
an overview). A particularly fruitful application of the theory is costly religious
practice (e.g., Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Carvalho 2012; Patel 2012; Hall et al. 2015;
Aksoy and Gambetta 2016). Patel (2012) analyzes veiling, various forms of religious
dresses and head covers, as a costly signal.1 Veiling informs others on a woman’s
piety and modesty. Piety and modesty are unobservable but valuable traits in social
relations in general, but particularly in the marriage market and the job market.
Hall et al. (2015) show experimentally that those who emit costly religious signals
are perceived to be more trustworthy, even by people who believe in a different
religion than the signaler. Carvalho (2012) models veiling as a commitment device
that limits temptation to break religious norms. In Carvalho’s (2012) model, too,
veiling may serve as a signal, broadly defined, for it conveys a message to the
community or ill-intentioned men that the woman has committed herself to her
religion. Aksoy and Gambetta (2016) test some predictions of those models of
veiling and find empirical support.
In most applications of signaling theory, the focus is on what the signal tells the
receiver about some unobservable trait of the signaler. In the above mentioned mod-
els of veiling (Carvalho 2012; Patel 2012; Aksoy and Gambetta 2016), for example,
the veil signals a reputation for piety and modesty for the veiled woman. Yet, there
are strong reasons to believe that in humans, individual reputation extends beyond
the self, particularly to the other members of one’s family. Actions of other family
members affect the reputation of the individual, and an individual’s actions affect
the reputation of his or her family. Family reputation, in turn, affects very important
outcomes for all family members. These outcomes include social approval and
trust in the community, prospects in the marriage market, and chances in the job
market (Hoodfar 1997; Singerman 1997; Clark 2004). This social aspect of individual
reputation in humans is largely ignored in most applications of signaling theory. In
this study, I show that having a child as well as the sex of one’s child have profound
effects on the religious signaling of the mother.
Veiling originated in Mesopotamia long before the inception of any organized
monotheistic religion (Lerner 1986; David 2011). It was then emulated in ancient
Greece and later on in all Abrahamic religions (David 2011). In modern times,
however, the practice remains widespread primarily among Muslims. In the West,
the veil is now seen as an affront to Western values (Helbling 2014; Adida, Laitin,
and Valfort 2016). In fact, certain forms of veiling are banned in several European
countries. When it is seen through a signaling lens, however, the veil does not
necessarily imply an ideological conflict or religious fundamentalism. It may
simply be a signal used by women to convey some information about their and
their families’ reputation. As I will show below, a woman can take up the veil if the
potential benefits of a pious reputation increase, even if her religiosity, ideology, or
values remain unchanged.
Hypotheses
In the Muslim world, piety and modesty are valuable but unobservable traits which
are sought after in social relations, in the marriage market (Patel 2012), and in
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the job market (Clark 2004). A reputation for piety also fosters social acceptance
and approval by one’s community (Carvalho 2012). Once a family has a child,
there is a greater need for the family’s reputation to be good. This is because the
community monitors individuals and individuals’ families continuously, and future
success of adolescents in the marriage and job market depends strongly on family
reputation. Singerman (1997), for example, reports that traditional values of a bride
or groom’s family are often taken as a sign of the bride or groom’s good character
and suitability for marriage. Veiling is generally thought to be a strong signal of
piety and modesty (Patel 2012; Aksoy and Gambetta 2016), both for the veiled
woman and for her family alike. Ethnographic studies report indeed that women
may veil to protect the family’s reputation, honor, and good name (Hoodfar 1997).
Hence, I predict that having a child increases the likelihood that a woman wears
the veil (hypothesis 1). Note that if having a child increases the importance of a
good family reputation, then having more children increases this importance even
further. Consequently, the likelihood of veiling should increase as the number of
children increases. In addition, as the child grows up, he or she approaches the
marriage or the job market and a good family reputation becomes more and more
important. I thus also predict that the older the child of a woman, the higher the
likelihood that the woman wears the veil (hypothesis 2). Section A of the online
supplement presents a simple formal model that predicts those effects.
I also expect that the sex of a woman’s child will affect the intensity of the
woman’s religious signaling. Potential benefits of a reputation for piety and mod-
esty may differ between the two sexes. Generally, men have higher stakes in the
job market than women (Oswald and Powdthavee 2010). Hence, as far as their
children’s prospects in the job market are considered, mothers of boys may have
stronger incentives to invest in a pious reputation than mothers of girls. On the
other hand, one may argue that in the marriage market, a reputation for piety and
modesty may be more important for females than for males. But then mothers of
girls are in a different position than mothers of boys: girls are able to signal piety
and modesty by veiling themselves, but boys lack this alternative. See section A of
the online supplement for a formal treatment of this idea. Hence, when prospects
in the job market and the marriage market are considered, mothers of boys may
have stronger incentives to invest in a good reputation than mothers of girls. I thus
expect that the likelihood of wearing the veil will be higher among mothers of boys
than mothers of girls (hypothesis 3).
Past research suggests that having a son versus daughter makes people have
more conservative political orientations (Warner 1991; Washington 2008; Oswald
and Powdthavee 2010), but also see Lee and Conley (2016). Although a general
increase in conservatism because of having a son is consistent with the signaling idea
presented above, hypothesis 3 is more specific. The hypothesis does not predict that
having a son versus daughter will cause an increase in religiosity or conservative
values in general. Rather, it predicts that outward displays of religiosity, particularly
the likelihood of veiling, will increase.
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Empirical Context
I test my hypotheses primarily using data from Turkey. Using the Pew World
Muslims Survey, I also test hypothesis 1 with data from 25 countries. The Pew data,
however, do not allow me to test hypothesis 2 and 3. Because of this empirical
focus, in this section I provide some contextual information on religion and veiling
in contemporary Turkey.
Traditionally, Turkey has been a constitutionally secular state, although a vast
majority of Turkish citizens define themselves as highly religious (KONDA Re-
search & Consultancy 2007). Veiling had been banned in public offices, including
courts, military facilities, Parliament, and public universities. Political Islam has
long been in the Turkish political arena, but the 2002 general elections marked a
significant turning point in Turkish politics (Aksoy and Billari 2017). In 2002, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the national elections with an explicit Is-
lamist platform. Since then, the compulsory de-veiling laws have been relaxed, and
religion increased its presence and importance in the public life. This political shift
is accompanied by a fast growing veiling fashion industry (Gökarıksel and Secor
2010a,b). In the 1980s and 1990s, veiling styles were limited to lengthy overcoats and
large scarves with rather muted colors (Gökarıksel and Secor 2010b). Recently, how-
ever, more colorful and diverse veiling styles have become widespread, particularly
among young, urbanized, and educated women. Since the 2000s, the türban has
become a symbol of religious politicization and of religious expression, whereas the
headscarf represents a more traditional religious form (Saktanber and Çorbaciog˘lu
2008). Aksoy and Gambetta (2016) show that pious women may use the türban
instead of the traditional headscarf to signal their piety and modesty. Although
differences between the various veiling styles are important, in the Turkish data set
that I use veiling is measured as a binary variable.
Studying religious signaling and veiling in Turkey is interesting for the following
reasons. Despite the aforementioned rising influence of political Islam (Aksoy and
Billari 2017), Turkey is still one of the most liberal Muslim-majority countries. In
modern Turkey, formal regulations on veiling are far less strong compared with
other Muslim-majority countries. Thus, veiling is primarily a decision of the woman
or of her family rather than a legal obligation (Aksoy and Gambetta 2016). Secondly,
the coexistence of multiple “types” (e.g., religious and secular) makes religious
signaling particularly important in this context. If veiling was universal, then its
signaling value would be nonexistent (Patel 2012).
Data and Methods
Data
I use Turkey’s 2013 Demographic and Health Survey (THDS) as the primary data
source. TDHS targeted a representative sample of all households in Turkey with
a weighted, multistage, stratified cluster sampling approach. Women between
the ages of 15 to 49 living in the randomly sampled households were interviewed
(Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies 2014). The response rates
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were 93 percent at the household level and 90 percent at the individual level. In
addition to a rich set of measures of demographic behavior and attitudes, the survey
included a question on whether the respondent covered her head when outside
the home. To my knowledge, Turkey is the only country in the Muslim world that
included a question on veiling in its demographic and health surveys. TDHS is also
one of the most detailed and reliable sources of individual-level demographic and
social behavior in Turkey.
In addition to TDHS, I use the Pew Research Center (2013) World Muslim’s
Survey for robustness checks. The Pew survey was conducted from 2011 to 2012
in 26 Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories,
Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Morocco has to
be excluded from the analysis because some data are completely missing in this
country as a result of administrative error (Pew Research Center 2013). The survey
employs stratified area probability sampling that yields nationally representative
samples in the majority of the countries.
These data sets are available from the Hacettepe University Institute of Popu-
lation Studies and Pew Research Center, but restrictions apply to the availability
of these data, which were used under license for the current study and so are not
publicly available. Data are, however, available from the author upon reasonable
request and with permission from the Hacettepe University Institute of Population
Studies and Pew Research Center.
Analysis Strategy
I test hypothesis 1 using TDHS with two approaches. The first approach is a
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). My ultimate aim is to
compare women who have children with otherwise very similar women who are
yet to have a child. For this purpose, I restrict my analyses to women who were
married at the time of the TDHS. In Turkey, only about 2.7 percent of annual births
happen outside marriage. This one of the lowest figures among Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development countries. Additionally, a Kaplan–Meier
survival estimate obtained using TDHS shows that the probability of remaining
childless after about 10 years into one’s marriage is virtually zero (see Figure 1).
Hence, in Turkey, effectively all married women have at least one child sooner or
later.
The propensity score matching procedure is implemented as follows. I firstly
match married women who have a single child at the time of the survey with
married women who do not yet have a child by then. To obtain the propensity
scores, I first predict the probability of having no child versus having a single
child using a logistic regression model. This logistic regression model includes the
following predictor variables: education, age, wealth, employment status, whether
the women lives in an urban area as opposed to a rural area, ethnicity (Turkish,
Kurdish, Arabic, or other ethnicity), geographical region (north, east, south, west),
the ideal number of children, whether the respondent performs the religious salah
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Figure 1: Probability of remaining childless throughout one’s marriage in Turkey.
rituals regularly, whether the respondent fasts regularly, and a “traditional values”
score, which is the average of six binary items that measure a number of gender
values and norms. The items are as follows: “the important decisions in the family
should be made only by men,” “men should also do the housework like cooking,
washing, ironing, and cleaning,” “it is better to educate a son than a daughter,”
“women with children should not work outside the home,” “women should be more
involved in politics,” and “women should be virgin when they get married.” The
second and the fifth items are reverse coded before calculating the average score.
After the propensities are estimated in this first step, each woman in the control
group (no child) is then matched with a woman in the treatment group (one child)
who has a very similar propensity score.
Figure 2 below presents diagnostics for the procedure to match women who
had no children at the time of the survey with women who had a single child. The
figure shows absolute mean differences in the covariates between the treated and
control cases before and after matching. There are sizable differences between the
treated and control cases before matching, particularly with respect to age, the
ideal number of children, and the traditional values score—the average of the six
items that measure gender norms and values. Those differences disappear after
matching. I thus conclude that the matching of childless women with mothers of
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Figure 2: Covariate balance checks before and after propensity score matching between married women with
one child and married women with no children.
one is successful, and I can obtain a treatment and a control group that are balanced
in all key covariates. After the matching stage, I then estimate and compare the
likelihood of veiling in the no child and in the one child groups. I estimate an
average treatment effect for the controls (ATC)—that is, how much having a child
would affect the probability of wearing the veil for a childless and married woman.
I further aim to ascertain whether there is a “dose–response” relationship be-
tween the number of children and the likelihood of veiling. For this purpose I
match, using the same procedure explained above, (1) married women who had
two children at the time of the survey with married but yet childless women and
(2) married women who had three or more children at the time of the survey with
married but yet childless women. Matching is less successful in these two cases, as
it is difficult to find women who have more than one child by the time of the survey
and are very similar to childless women in all key covariates. Figure 3 shows that
there are differences in covariates even after matching, particularly with respect to
age. Hence, the results regarding the comparison of childless women with mothers
of two or more should be interpreted with caution because of a lack of satisfactory
covariate balance. Nevertheless, I control for all of the covariates used in the first
matching stage also in the analysis stage.
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Figure 3: Covariate balance checks before and after matching adjustment. No child versus two children (left
panel); no child versus three or more children (right panel).
The second approach I use to test hypothesis 1 consists of conventional logistic
regression models that predict the probability of veiling using dummy indicators
of one child versus no child, two children versus no child, and three or more
children versus no child. In these logistic regression models, I control for the
same set of predictors used in the propensity score matching procedure described
above (also see section B of the online supplement). After ascertaining that the
propensity score matching and regressions with covariate adjustment approaches
give virtually identical results, I use logistic regressions with covariate adjustment
to test hypothesis 2. Furthermore, I use the same covariate adjustment strategy to
analyze the Pew data as a robustness check. Because there are 25 countries in the
Pew survey, I fit a single multilevel logistic regression model to the whole data, with
random effects for countries (Snijders and Bosker 2012). In this model, I control
for urbanicity (vs. rural), income (country-specific z-scores), education (country
specific z-scores), a religiosity measure constructed from six items (Cronbach’s
α = 0.69) and the prevalence of veiling in one’s district (see section C of the online
supplement for further details).
Both propensity score matching and regressions with covariate adjustment
rely on observed covariates and cannot account for unobserved omitted variables.
Hence, one cannot fully establish causality with those strategies. Nevertheless,
testing the same hypothesis in two different data sets with different sets of controls,
different data analysis approaches, and a dose–response relationship (should there
be one) should give us some indication of the robustness of the findings.
I have a stronger identification strategy for testing hypothesis 3. I use the sex of
the first child as a natural experiment. Biologically, the sex of a child is expected
to be random. There is no evidence for sex-selective abortion or for excess female
infant mortality for first children in Turkey (Altindag 2016). In the TDHS data, the
proportion of males among first births is 52.7 percent. Although this is slightly
higher than the global expectation of 51.5 percent, in countries that are similar to
Turkey in terms of climate and latitude (such as Malta, Greece, and Portugal), the
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sex ratio is generally skewed towards more boys with 51.7 percent (Grech, Savona-
Ventura, and Vassallo-Agius 2002). The male ratio of 52.7 percent found in the TDHS
data is not statistically significantly different from 51.7 percent (z = 1.57, p = 0.116).
In addition, Figure 4 compares women whose first child is a girl with women
whose first child is a boy with respect to a number of key covariates. None of the
differences is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. I thus conclude that in Turkey,
the first child’s sex serves as a natural experiment.
Note that in a natural experiment, both observed and unobserved pre-treatment
covariates are expected to be balanced in the treatment and the control groups.
Hence, I do not expect an omitted variable bias when I test the effect of the sex of
the first child on veiling probability. I, however, cannot rule out reverse causality
with data alone (i.e., veiling effecting the sex of the first child). Nevertheless, it is
very difficult to find a credible causal mechanism through which veiling affects the
sex of the first child. As Figure 4 shows, inner religiosity and gender values and
norms are not associated with the sex of the first child.
There are reasons to expect that the total number of sons or the total number
of daughters a mother has will not be random. This is because some couples may
exhibit a son-biased stopping decision—that is, they may use contraception after
having a son. There is evidence for this in Turkey (Altindag 2016). Moreover, the
sex of older siblings seems to have an effect on the survival of the second or later
offspring (Altindag 2016). Consequently, the sex of children born in the second
parity or later will not serve as a natural experiment as the sex of the first child
does. In addition, when I test hypothesis 3, I do not control for the total number
of children. This is because the total number of children is likely affected by the
sex of the first child because of the above-mentioned son-biased stopping rule
(Gelman 2007). Unfortunately, the Pew survey does not include information on the
respondents’ children’s sex and age.
In TDHS, missing data constitute less than 1.7 percent of all cases, hence I safely
use listwise deletion (Allison 2001). In the Pew survey, missing data are more
prevalent: they constitute ∼11 percent of all cases. I use multiple imputation with
chained equations (Van Buuren 2007) to impute the missing data. Section C of the
online supplement shows that the results obtained with multiple imputation are
rather similar to the results obtained with listwise deletion.
Results
Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported: having children is associated with a significant
increase in the likelihood of wearing the veil. Figure 5 shows the estimated marginal
effects. Note that the estimates in Figure 5 are obtained after controlling for a
number of key covariates such as education, age, wealth, ethnicity, ideal number of
children, religiosity, urbanicity, and the gender values and norms, with propensity
score matching and regressions with covariate adjustment. In Turkey, 57.9 percent
of married and childless women veil. Having one, two, and three or more children
increase the probability of wearing the veil by 5.2 (z = 2.49, p = 0.013), 10 (z =
4.40, p < 0.001), and 12.7 (z = 4.79, p < 0.001) percentage points, respectively.
As a comparison, a single standard deviation (∼4.2 years) increase in education
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= 6,241). Thick lines show ±1 standard errors (68 percent confidence interval), and thin lines show ±1.96
standard errors (95 percent confidence interval).
is associated with a 7-percentage-point decrease in the probability of veiling (see
section B of the online supplement). Hence, the effect of having a child on veiling is
rather large.
There is a clear dose–response relationship between the number of children
and the likelihood of wearing the veil. The results obtained with propensity score
matching are very similar to the results obtained with logistic regressions with
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Figure 5: Marginal effects (average treatment effect for controls) of having one, two, or three or more children
as opposed to having no children on the probability of veiling. Results are obtained after controlling for
several variables (see section Data and Methods), either with propensity score matching or covariate-adjusted
logistic regressions. Thick lines show ±1 standard errors (68 percent confidence interval), and thin lines
show ±1.96 standard errors (95 percent confidence interval). Turkey estimates are obtained using Turkey’s
2013 Demographic and Health Survey (N = 6,721). Muslim world estimates are obtained using the Pew
World Muslims survey (N = 11,035). The Pew estimates are obtained after controlling for random effects for
25 countries and a number of other control variables (see Data and Methods).
covariate adjustment. Using a completely different data set with a different set of
control variables, I obtain remarkably similar estimates in the 25 countries of the
Muslim world. I also test whether the effect of having children on veiling varies
across the 25 Muslim countries by adding random slopes in the model. Results
show that there is not enough evidence in the data against the stability of effects in
the Muslim world (likelihood ratio χ2(3) = 2.22, p = 0.529).
Hypothesis 2 is supported too (Figure 6). For every year increase in the age of
the first child, the probability of wearing the veil increases by about 0.6 percent-
age points (z = 5.65, p < 0.001). This result is obtained after controlling for the
aforementioned variables, including the age of the mother. There is no significant
interaction between the sex and age of the first child.
Hypothesis 3 is also supported (Figure 6): the probability of veiling is about 2.2
percentage points higher when the first child of a woman is a boy as opposed to a
girl (76.1 percent versus 73.9 percent). The effect size corresponds to the effect of
about a two-year decrease in education. The effect of having a son versus daughter
remains virtually identical after controlling for a number of key covariates, includ-
ing education, age, wealth, employment status, ethnicity, ideal number of children,
whether the respondent performs the religious salah rituals regularly, whether the
respondent fasts regularly, urbanicity, and the gender values and norms of the
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Figure 6: Marginal effects of the sex of the first child (boy versus girl) and the age of the first child on the
probability of wearing the veil. Thick lines are ±1 standard errors (68 percent confidence interval), and thin
lines are ±1.96 standard errors (95 percent confidence interval). The figure shows the effect of first child’s
sex with and without controls and the effect of first child’s age with controls. (N = 6,241).
respondent. This is reassuring because in proper natural experiments, the treat-
ment is expected to not correlate with the covariates, and hence controlling for the
covariates should not change the estimated treatment effect. With or without con-
trolling for covariates, the effect of the sex of the first child is statistically significant
(z = 2.05, p = 0.040 without controls; z = 2.28, p = 0.022 with controls).
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
In this section, I first test whether having a child and the sex of the first child
affect religiosity and traditional values in general. Figure 7 shows that having a
child versus none does not have a significant effect on religiosity and traditional
values of mothers. This analysis also shows that because traditional values and
religiosity are not affected by having a child, controlling for them in the analyses
that predict veiling does not bias the results (i.e., traditional values and religiosity
are not intermediate outcomes in the child–veiling association). Note also that
the sex of the first child does not affect religiosity and traditional values either
(Figure 4).
Including divorced, widowed, and separated women in the analysis results
in virtually identical estimates for the effect of having a child (marginal effect
[ME] = 0.04, z = 2.37, p = 0.018) and of the sex of the first child (ME = 0.02,
z = 2.30, p = 0.022) on veiling probability. Similarly, using an entropy balancing
method up to the third moment (Hainmueller and Xu 2013) instead of propensity
score matching results in effectively identical estimates for the effect of having a
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Figure 7: Marginal effects of having a child on religiosity and gender values. Thick lines are±1 standard errors
(68 percent confidence interval), and thin lines are ±1.96 standard errors (95 percent confidence interval).
Estimates are obtained with propensity score matching for childless married women and married mothers of
one on several covariates (N = 1,024).
single (ME = 0.05, z = 2.02, p = 0.044), two (ME = 0.11, z = 3.61, p < 0.001), and
three or more children (ME = 0.16, z = 1.68, p = 0.095) on veiling probability. There
is no statistically significant interaction between the sex of the first child and total
number of children a woman has on the probability of veiling (interaction b = 0.01,
z = 0.19, p = 0.850). The sex of the first child does not affect the probability of
being divorced (ME = 0.00, z = 0.57, p = 0.568). Finally, there is no evidence in the
data that the effect of the sex of the first child (LR χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.000) and of
having a child (LR χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.000) on veiling probability vary across the 81
provinces of Turkey. These latter results are obtained by fitting multilevel logistic
regression models with random effects at the province level.
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Discussion
I find that motherhood and the sex of the offspring are strongly associated with
outward expressions of religiosity but have no associations with unobservable
religious behaviors, traditional values, and gender norms. These results are con-
sistent with the conjecture that women use the veil strategically to foster family
reputation. Signaling theory and other game theoretic models provide important
insights into the underlying mechanisms of costly religious practices. Those models
often consider the costs and benefits of religious practices for the practitioner alone.
My results contribute to this literature by suggesting that the signaling value of
such religious practices increases after having an offspring and varies by the sex of
the offspring. This important role of the family in religious signaling, in turn, helps
explain the persistence of costly religious practices such as veiling.
Before closing, I will address firstly an empirical and then a theoretical limitation
and suggest avenues for future research. Firstly, I can establish the robustness of
the association between the number of children a woman has and the likelihood
of veiling using data from 25 countries. The positive effect of having a son versus
daughter and of the age of one’s child on veiling probability I document in this
study, however, is limited to 2010’s Turkey. In Turkey, religion’s presence in the
public domain has increased dramatically in the last decade. It is likely that the
importance of a reputation for religiosity and the signaling value of the veil may
have increased in the last decade too. Turkey is also different from other Muslim-
majority countries in various ways. Whether the sex and age of a woman’s child
affect veiling in similar ways in other countries and contexts remains to be explored.
Theoretically, I argue that women who give birth to a child and to a son versus
daughter are subsequently more likely to take up the veil in order to foster family
reputation. This suggests that veiling serves as a signal of piety even after years
of not veiling. If the receiver is a stranger, they would not know when exactly a
woman has taken up the veil so the signal would work. The community, however,
monitors its members and would know that the woman has taken up the veil at a
later time. Hence, one may think that if the receiver is a community member, the
veil may not serve as a reliable signal of piety. In the formal model presented in
the online supplement (section A), there is a partially-pooling equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the pious type veils with some positive probability and the nonpious
type does not veil at all. Hence, wearing the veil, no matter how late, is enough
to separate the pious type from the nonpious. In other words, wearing the veil
even after years of not veiling is better in terms of signaling piety than not veiling
at all. Whether this indeed applies in real life and how receivers perceive a veil
taken up recently are open issues. This point is related to the more general issue of
a signal’s reliability in revealing the underlying trait. I leave a detailed analysis of
the reliability of the veil as a signal of piety to future work.
Veiling predates all organized monotheistic religions. It was later on adopted
in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In contemporary Western societies, however,
the practice is associated exclusively with Islam. The persistence of veiling among
Muslims is often interpreted as an ideological affront to Western values and an
indicator of religious fundamentalism. Some forms of veiling are banned in several
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Western countries. The signaling models of veiling, however, suggest that the veil is
only a noisy proxy of religiosity. The current study, for example, shows that having
a child and the sex of one’s first child affect the probability that a woman veils
without affecting the woman’s values, norms, and religiosity.
Notes
1 As an aside, I use the term ”veiling” to refer to a broad range of head covers and
conservative dresses, including the headscarf, al-amira, türban, khimar, hijab, shayla, niqab,
and burqa. Except niqab and burqa, all those styles leave the face open.
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